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IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH

* * * * *

TERRI C. HARDY, widow of Bryce
W. Hardy, deceased.

PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.
Case No,
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

Defendant/Petitioner.

* * * * *

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Is the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in conflict

with this Court's precedents by ruling that a death resulting from
drug abuse was accidental, despite the deceased's actual knowledge
that his continued abuse would result in his death?
II.

Is the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in conflict

with this Court's precedents by failing to apply the maxim that
1

every man must be held

to

intend

the natural

and probable

consequences of his deeds?

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner applies to this Court for review by a Writ of
Certiorari of the judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals. The slip
opinion of the Court of Appeals is reproduced in the Appendix
hereto (App. 1-5, hereinafter referred to as "Slip 0p.,f) and is
reported at 126 U.A.R. 14 (Utah App. 1990).

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals1 decision sought to be reviewed was
entered on January 25, 1990.

On February 20, 1990, this Court

entered an Order extending the time within which to petition for
certiorari to March 23, 1990.

This Court has jurisdiction to

review the Court of Appeals' decision by a Writ of Certiorari
pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, §3; Utah Code Ann. §78-22(2) ,(3) (a) and (5); and R. Utah S. Ct. 42, 43 and 45.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Terri C. Hardy for insurance
benefits under an accidental death insurance policy on the life of
her deceased husband.

The case was presented to the trial court

on a Stipulated Statement of Facts (R. 835).

The District Court

entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor
of Mrs. Hardy, holding that Mr. Hardy died as the result of an
2

accident (R. 831).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District

Court,

STATEMENT OP FACTS
• •

Br y c e W

Har d/y (ill eci o n S e p t e m b e r 10, ] 981

of narcotic intoxication (R
death, Hardy

had engaged

as a resul t

835). For eight years prior to his
in an extended course of action in

misusing and abtis.iin-| druijs IH.H

least twc! occasions

^

during this period of time, Hardy was hospitalized and near death
as

a resuit

of narcotic intoxication (R. 838-839).

In 197 7, he

attempted suicide by taking an overdose of Valium and alcohol, and
again in April 198] , just fi re months before hi s death, he was
again hospitalized with an overdose

Darvon arid Methadone (R

838-839) , During the course of his continuing abuse of drugs,
Hardy was repeatedl

(R. 838-839)

warned by his physicians and other health

In March 1981, Hardy told a clinical social worker

that he had a history of drug abuse, that he wanted to di e

and

that Lf he got a chance he won Id k:i I 1 h erased,f. The soci a ] worker
warned him "that if he did not stop abusing and misusing drugs, he
would end up killing himself"

838-839).

end of May IMCrl l , IfiLitdy was h
of drug dependency (R. 8 39).
admitted in

From March 23 to the

i.i zed three times tor treatment
On one of those occasions he was

omatose state after taking an overdose oi Darvon

and Methadone i.-.. 840). While hospitalized, he was advised by his
doctor that "his continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a
3

life-shortening process and that he would be living on borrowed
time."

He was further warned that those "who abuse and misuse

drugs, in the manner which he had done, live very short lives and
that few of those who continue to abuse and misuse drugs to the
degree that Bryce W. Hardy had done lived beyond the age of
thirty" (R. 841).
warning

and

Mr. Hardy voiced his understanding of this

later

in

his

hospitalization

expressed

his

understanding and expectation that he would die if he continued to
abuse drugs.

He told a nurse that he would rather be in the

hospital than be dead (R. 841).
On the night of September 9, or the morning of September
10, 1981, Mr. Hardy consumed an undetermined amount of codeine and
propoxyphene (Darvon), both centrally acting narcotic analgesics,
and trimethobenzamide (Tigan), an anti emetic agent.

The drugs

were not prescribed by a physician for medical purposes.

Mr.

Hardy died on the morning of September 10, 1981, at the age of
twenty-nine (R. 836).
At the time of his death Mr. Hardy was insured by
Beneficial Life Insurance Company under the terms of two group
policies.

One providing benefits of $25,000.00 in the event of

death regardless of cause and the other providing a benefit of
$25,000.00 only in case of accidental death.

Plaintiff Terri

Hardy is the named beneficiary of both policies.

The benefits

under the first policy were paid and this action relates to the
accidental

death policy which provides

follows:

4

in pertinent

part as

Accidental Death: The Company will pay the
sum for which application was made by the
Insured upon receipt of due proof that the
insured's
death
resulted,
directly and
independently of all other causes, from
accidental bodily injury, . . •
(R. 387)
The trial court concluded that Mr

Hardy's death was

accidentia I because "the sir ,i pu I ated it act s do not. demons!: rate

I, hat

Mr. Bryce Hardy either intended or expected that his consumption
of drugs would cause his death on September 10, 1981" (R. 833).
jpet.i t i o n e i

.appealed

the

1 r i.il

eutiii: ' s

i;lt;e i s i uni

January 25, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed.

Oi l

The current

p e t i t i o n t o t h i s Court i s for review by a Writ of C e r t i o r a r i of
t h a t d e c i s l o i i.

ARGUMENT

T-

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
IS IN CONFLICT WITH THIS
PRECEDENT

COURT'S

ULING THA T A DEATH

RESULTING

FROM

DRUG

ABUSE

WAS

ACCIDENTAL, DESPITE THE DECEASED'S
ACTUAL. KNOWLEDGE! THA1!1 HIS CONTINUE!)
ABUSE WOULD RESULT IN DEATH.
The Utah Court
2 b , 19 9 0, c o r r e c t L y s t a 1
that his continued abuse
time. (Slip Op. at 4.)

xhis

Appeals, i n i ts decision of January
,t e<i t.u -j 4" M it" . H a rdj knew

-.

: drugs would result

death at some

Court, in its decis±un in Hoffman v.

5

Life Insurance Co, of North America. 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983) held
that "a person is a victim of an accident when from the victim's
point of view, the occurrence causing the injury or death is not
a

natural

and

probable

result

of

the

victim's

own

acts."

Conversely, a person is not a victim of an accident when the
victim

knows that his

course of conduct

probably result in death.

will

naturally

and

In Hoffman, this Court set forth the

governing standard as follows:
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance Co..
58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017 (1921), this Court
first laid down the standard for defining the
words "accident or "accidental" as used in an
accidental death insurance policy.
The word is descriptive of means which
produce effects which are not their
natural and probable consequences.... An
effect which is the natural and probable
consequence of an act or course of action
is not an accident, nor is it produced by
accidental means.
It is either the
result of actual design, or it falls
under the maxim that every man must be
held to intend the natural and probable
consequence of his deeds. [Emphasis
added.]
Id. at 636, 200 P. at 1023 (quoting Western
Commercial Travelers' Association v. Smith, 85
F. 401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898)). In Richards the
Court also defined the phrase "natural and
probable consequence," stating:
The natural consequence of means used
[is] the consequence which ordinarily
follows from their use - the result which
may be reasonably anticipated from their
use, and which ought to be expected. The
probable consequence of the use of given
means is the consequence which is more
likely to follow from their use than it
is to fail to follow.
Id. 669 P.2d at 415-416.

6

As stated above, not only is an effect which is the
natural and probable consequence of a single act not an accident,
but

likewise

an

effect

which

is

the

natural

and

probable

consequence of a course of action is also not an accident.
critical

The

factor in both instances is "whether the event was

naturally and probably expected or anticipated by the insured."
Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 416.
In its analysis, the Utah Court of Appeals found the
"critical question in this case" to be !'whether Hardy expected
that the natural and probable result of his ingestion of drugs on
the evening of September 9 or the morning of September 10, 1981,
would be his imminent death."

(Slip Op* at 3.)

The Court of

Appeals failed to analyze Mr. Hardy's death in light of his course
of action.
An examination of the facts in this case, in accordance
with this Court's holdings in Richards and Hoffman, involves two
steps.

First, a determination of the cause of death, and second,

a determination

of whether

death

from that

cause,

from the

viewpoint of the decedent, was the natural and probable result of
either a single act by the decedent or of a course of action
undertaken by the decedent.
Mr. Hardy died on September 10, 1981, from the misuse
and

abuse

intoxication.

of

prescription

drugs

resulting

in

narcotic

(Stipulated Facts 1, 2, 9, 10, R. 835-37.)

The

sole remaining issue is whether Mr. Hardy's death from this cause

7

was expected or anticipated by him.
As
accidental

this

Court

stated

in

Richards,

death

is

not

if it is the "natural and probable result of the

insured's voluntary

act unaccompanied

by

anything

unforeseen

except the death".

58 Utah at 635, 200 P. at 1022.

As the

Stipulated Facts reveal, Mr. Hardy understood "that the probable
and expected consequence of his continued misuse and abuse of
drugs would be his untimely death".
[T]he common meaning of the term
[accident] is defined in terms of
whether the event was naturally and
probably expected or anticipated by
the insured.
Where the insured expected or
anticipated that death would follow
from his or her conduct recovery
has been denied.
. . . .

Thus, if the insured actually knows
that his or her death is more likely
than not to occur, the death is not
accidental, (emphasis added)
Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 416, 417, 419.
As acknowledged by the Court of Appeals, Mr. Hardyfs
death from the misuse and abuse of drugs was expected by him.
Thus, by definition, his death cannot be deemed accidental.

Yet

the Court of Appeals, while concluding that Mr. Hardy knew he
would die from continued drug abuse, has ruled the death as
accidental.

Such a conclusion is clearly erroneous. Applying the

principles of Richards and Hoffman to the Stipulated Facts of this
case: "an effect [death from the misuse and abuse of drugs] which

8

is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of
action [continued drug abuse and misuse over an eight year period
of time] is not an accident11.

II.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS1 DECISION
IS IN CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S
PRECEDENTS BY FAILING TO APPLY THE
MAXIM THAT EVERY MAN MUST BE HELD TO
INTEND

THE

NATURAL

AND

PROBABLE

CONSEQUENCE OF HIS DEEDS.
In Richards, this Court stated that an effect "which is
the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action
is not an accident . . . It is either the result of actual design,
or it falls under the maxim that every man must be held to intend
the natural and probable consequences of his deeds." 58 Utah at
636, 200 P. at 1023.

(Emphasis added)

The Court of Appeals

failed to apply this principle to this ca$e.
Mr. Hardy understood that death would be the natural and
probable

consequence

of

continued

drug

abuse

and

misuse.

(Stipulated Fact 29, 34; R. 841-42). The Court of Appeals found
that Mr. Hardy knew that death would be the result
continued drug abuse "at some time" (Slip Op. at 4) .

of his

The court

went on to rule, however, that it could not be assumed that "Hardy
intended or expected to die on each occasion when he took drugs.
. ."

(Slip Op. at 4). Such a ruling is not in accord with this

Court's holding in Richards and Hoffman that an effect which is
9

the natural and probable consequence of a course of conduct is not
an accident and that it must be assumed that the victim intended
the natural and probable consequences which follow.
Applying this maxim to Mr. Hardy, he must be held to
have intended the natural and probable consequences of his deeds
and therefore he must be held to have intended or expected to die
on each occasion that he continued to abuse drugs.
The facts establish that Mr. Hardy continued to abuse
drugs and that he died as a result of that course of action.

He,

therefore, expected and intended that his consumption of drugs on
September

9

or

10,

1981,

would

result

in

his

immediate

death.
CONCLUSION
The
conclusion

Court

that

of

there

Appeals
was

rested

"insufficient

its decision
evidence

that

on the
Hardy

expected, with the high level of certainty required by Hoffman,
that his ingestion of drugs on September 9 or 10, 1981, would lead
to his immediate death." (Slip Op. at 4.)
this Court require a broader inquiry.

The prior decisions of

The critical question is

whether Mr. Hardy intended or expected to die from the misuse or
abuse of drugs.

If so, and if he died from the abuse of drugs,

his death was not an accident.

The Court of Appeals found that

Mr. Hardy not only expected, but knew that his continued drug
abuse would result in his death. His death was, therefore, the
natural and probable result of his course of action, was not an
unexpected mishap and was not accidental.
10

Moreover, Mr, Hardy knew that he would die at some time
if he continued to abuse drugs.

Since he did continue to abuse

drugs and he did die, then he must be held to have intended the
consequence of his continued drug abuse and his death was not
accidental.
Dated this &&^

day of March, 1990.
ROMNEY & CONDIE

Holdsworth
George J. Romney
Attorneys for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing document were hand-delivered this ^^ —
March, 1990, to the following:
M. David Eckersley, Esq.
Donald R. Schow, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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ooOoo
OPINION
(For Publication)

Terri C. Hardy, widow of Bryce
W. Hardy,

a*^r

JAN 231990
s
<•*»'• Court
iort «*' Appeals

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 880464-CA

v.
Beneficial Life Insurance
Company, a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Scott Daniels
Attorneys:

££«*.>

George J. Romney and David J. Holdsworth, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
David Eckersley, Donald R. Schow, Salt Lake City,
for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant Beneficial Life Insurance Company (Beneficial
Life) appeals a final judgment awarding Terri C. Hardy
insurance benefits for the accidental death of her husband,
Bryce W. Hardy (Hardy). We affirm.
This case was presented to the trial court on stipulated
facts, which are summarized below. Hardy died on September 10,
1981, as a result of narcotic intoxication. Prior to liis
death, Hardy suffered from and had received treatment for drug
dependency and abuse. From 1973 to 1976, he used and abused
Darvon. He was repeatedly warned by his physician that he was
using excessive amounts of Darvon. In March 1977, Hardy
attempted suicide by taking an overdose of Valium tablets and
alcohol. By late 1977, Hardy was abusing controlled drugs
including codeine, Tylenol 3, Darvon, Tylox, Percodan, and
Valium. During 1981, Hardy, who was then suffering from back
pain and internal disorders associated with a diseased

1

pancreas, manipulated several doctors to obtain large
quantities of prescriptions for drugs. In March 1981, a
clinical social worker warned Hardy -that if he did not stop
abusing and misusing drugs, he would end up killing himself. From March 23 to May 31, 1981, Hardy was hospitalized three
times for treatment of drug dependency. During his treatment,
Hardy admitted that he was addicted to Valium and Percodan.
Doctor Robert Crist warned Hardy that -his continued misuse and
abuse of drugs would be a life-shortening process and that he
would be living on borrowed time.- Dr. Crist further warned
that -those who abuse and misuse drugs, in the manner which he
had done, live very short lives and that few of those who
continue to abuse and misuse drugs to the degree that Bryce W.
Hardy had done lived beyond the age of thirty.- While
hospitalized, Hardy told a nurse that he would rather be in the
hospital for a while than dead.
Terri Hardy testified at trial that on September 9, 1981,
the evening preceding Hardy's death, he did not appear anxious
or depressed and he made no statements, oral or written, that
he intended to commit suicide. She further testified that his
activities were routine and included making preparations for
the next day's work at his job, reading to his children, and
watching television.
On the night of September 9, or the morning of September
10, 1981, Hardy took an undetermined amount of drugs including
codeine, propoxyphene (Darvon), and trimethobenzamide (Tigan).
The drugs were not prescribed by a physician for medical
purposes. On the morning of September 10, 1981, Hardy, at the
age of twenty-nine, died of drug overdose.
At the time of his death, Hardy was insured by Beneficial
Life under the terms of two group policies. One provided
benefits of $25,000 in the event of death regardless of cause
and the other provided a benefit of $25,000 only in the case of
accidental death. Terri Hardy is the named beneficiary of both
policies. The benefits under the first policy were paid. This
action relates only to the accidental death policy, which
states that -[t]he Company will pay the sum for which
application was made by the Insured upon receipt of due proof
that the insured's death resulted, directly and independently
of all other causes, from accidental bodily injury. . . ."
The trial court concluded that Hardy's death was
accidental because the stipulated facts did not "demonstrate
that Mr. Hardy either intended or expected that his consumption
of drugs would cause his death on September 10, 1981."
Beneficial Life claims this conclusion is erroneous.

Because there is no dispute as to the facts, we address a
purely legal question: under the stipulated facts was the
death of Bryce from narcotic intoxification by accident within
the meaning of the life insurance policy?
STANDARD OF REVIEW|
A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness and are not given special deference. Bountiful v.
Riley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (1989); Western Kane County
Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376,
1378 (Utah 1987). Further, an insurance policy is a form of
contract and "[q]uestions of contract interpretation not
requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and
on such questions we accord the trial court's interpretation no
presumption of correctness." Zions First Nat'l Bank v.
National Am, Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988).
ANALYSIS
The applicable test, adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co, of N. Am., 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983),
in determining whether an event is accidental is not whether
the result is foreseeable, but whether it was expected. The
court stated: -Thus, since the common meaning of the term
[accident] is defined in terms of whether the event was
naturally and probably expected or anticipated by the insured,
it is that definition which must be applied, and not one
founded on foreseeability." Ici. at 416 (citations omitted).
The critical question in this case, therefore, is whether Hardy
expected that the natural and probable result of his ingestion
of drugs on the evening of September 9 or the morning of
September 10, 1981, would be his imminent death.
By employing an "expectation" standard in determining if
an event is accidental, Hoffman imposes a high threshold of
likelihood of injury or death for an event to qualify as a
nonaccident. "Expected" is a term that "'implies a high degree
of certainty.#- Id. (quoting Webster's Third International
Dictionary (1976)). "The 'unexpected event' standard . . . as
to what constitutes an accident includes not only death
resulting from conduct of the insured which is negligent, but
also death resulting from an insured's conduct which is
reckless." III. at 416-17.
Beneficial Life claims the death of Hardy was not an
accident under the terms of the policy. Beneficial Life argues
that the trial court erred by looking only to the events
immediately preceding the death, in determining whether death

880464-CA
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was intended or expected. Beneficial Life insists that Hardy's
death cannot be viewed in a vacuum; based on his long history
of drug abuse and his knowledge of the threat of death from
continued abuse, Hardy expected and intended to die on
September 10, 1981, after he consumed the drugs.
We find that there is insufficient evidence that Hardy
expected, with the high level of certainty required by Hoffman,
that his ingestion of drugs on September 9 or 10, 1981, would
lead to his immediate death. There is no evidence that Hardy
intended to commit suicide: there was no note, his activities
in the evening of September 9, 1981, apparently were routine
and normal, and there was no indication of depression or
abnormal behavior.
Further, we are not persuaded that Hardy's pattern of
drug abuse and his knowledge of the risks involved is
sufficient evidence under the Hoffman standard that he expected
to die from his consumption of drugs on September 9 or 10,
1981. Admittedly, because Hardy knew that his continued abuse
would result in death at some time, his act was reckless and
indicated bad judgment. We cannot assume, however, that Hardy
intended or expected to die on each occasion when he took drugs
simply because he failed to heed the warnings of others that he
should avoid taking narcotics. In fact, Hardy's own extensive
experience with drug abuse raises the inference that he would
not believe, with a high degree of certainty, that doing only
what he had been doing for some years would cause death on
September 10, 1981.
Because the evidence does not show that Hardy expected to
die on September 10, 1981, from his ingestion of drugs, we find
that the trial court did not err in determining that Hardy's
death was not accidental under the terms of the insurance
policy. Our decision is consistent with the majority of
jurisdictions that have faced this issue. Death from overdose,
absent affirmative evidence that the insured intended death, is
almost invariably treated as accidental. See, e.g., O'Toole v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1982); Minton v.
Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., 373 F.Supp. 33, 35 (D. Nev. 1974);
Pilcfrer v, New YQXK iiife Insf COt, 25 Cal. App. 3d 717, 102
Cal. Rptr. 82, 87-88 (1972); Russell v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 108 111. App. 3d 417, 439 N.E.2d 89, 91-93 (1982); Miller
v. Continental Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 675, 358 N.E.2d 258, 259-60
(N.Y. 1976); Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 225
A.2d 532, 535-37 (1976)A
Finally, we note a fundamental principle operative in
this case: "any ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of an

880464-CA
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insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage. Also,
since the policy is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities are
construed against that party.- LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins.
QQ^., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). Because the insurance
policy language in this case is, at best, ambiguous with regard
to drug overdose and death, we construe the policy in favor of
coverage. Insurance companies are free to incorporate policy
exclusions for death from drug overdose and if they do not
elect to do so, the courts should not write such an exclusion
into the policy. O'Toole, 671 F.2d at 915; Miller, 358 N.E.2d
at 260-61. M[T]he absence of a specific exclusion in the
policy drawn by the insurer supports a liberal interpretation
of the coverage.- Minton, 373 F.Supp. at 35.
Affirmed.
^

y

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge
<.*-,.•'" •».«*
LJ£-

Judith M. Billings, Judge
1. There are cases which hold that death from drug overdose
which is the unexpected result of a wholly intentional act is
not a death from accidental means. These jurisdictions
distinguish death by -accident- and death incurred by
-accidental means.- See, e.g.. Hargreaves v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 104 Cal. App. 3d 703, 163 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1980);
Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 Md. 320, 260 A.2d 338
(1970). "Even when applying the means test, however, the
courts nevertheless have held consistently that where the
voluntary action consisted of an unintentional overdose of
drugs, the resulting death occurred by an accidental means."
Pilcher v. New York Life Ins. Co., 2 5 Cal. App. 3d 717, 102
Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (1972).
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I N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

7

STATE OF UTAH

81
9

TERRI C. HARDY, widow of
ERYCE W. HARDY, deceased,
STTPUIATED STATEMENT OF FACTS

101
11

121
13

Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No. C-83-6569

BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

Honorable Scott Daniels

Defendant.

14

151

The Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record M. David

16

Eckersley, and the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record George

17

J. Romney, stipulate as follows:

18

1.

Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981, as a result of a

19

narcotic intoxication resulting from ingestion of drugs which nay lawfully

201

be obtained only by prescription.

21

2.

The Utah State Medical Examiner's report listed the cause of

221

death

23

intoxication" and the Medical Examiner described the manner of death as

24 J

'Undetermined'', as distinguished from 'Accident", 'Suicide", "Homicide' and

25

"Natural causes".

26

attached as Exhibit "A".

27

death as "Combined codeine, propoxyphene & trimothobenzamide intoxication"

as

a

'combined

codeine,

propoxyphene

and

trimothobenzamide

A copy of the Autopsy Report and Toxicology Report are
The Certificate of Death listed the cause of

28

QQVHnS

occurring from the "Ingestion of drugs" and described the manner of death
as "Undetermined if injured Accidentally or Purposely" as distinguished
frcm "Accident", "Suicide", "Homicide" and "Pending Investigation", A copy
of the Death Certificate is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
3.

Following Mr, Hardy's death the Plaintiff, Terri C, Hardy, and

her friend Julie Shepherd gave written statements to the police describing
the events preceding and immediately following Mr. Hardy's death.

Copies

of these statements are attached as Exhibits "C", "D", and "E".
4.

The Mt, Pleasant City Police Department prepared an Incident

Report describing events on the morning of Mr, Hardy's death,

A copy of

said report is attached as Exhibit "F".
5.

Plaintiff's evidence would show that on the evening preceding

his death, Mr, Hardy did not appear anxious or depressed and he made no
statements, oral or written, reflecting any intention to take his own life.
His activities, as observed by his wife, Terri Hardy, were routine and
included making preparations for the next day's work at his job, reading to
his children and watching television.

Defendant has no evidence to

contradict such evidence.
6.

On the night of September 9, 1981, or the morning of September

10, 1981, Mr. Hardy took an undetermined amount of drugs cxmtaining
codeine, propoxyphene (Darvon) and trimethobenzamide (Tigan).
7.

Codeine is a centrally acting narcotic analgesic. Propoxyphene

is also a centrally acting narcotic analgesic.

Trimethobenzamide is an

anti emetic agent.
8.

The quantity of drugs ingested by Mr. Hardy prior to his death

is not able to be determined from the autopsy, toxicological analysis or

00CS2£

j

any other existing data.
9.

o 11

There

is no evidence of Bryoe Hardy having obtained by

prescription the drugs which he ingested on the occasion of his death.

J

10. Defendant's evidence would shew that the ingested drugs were

^

self administered and were not prescribed by a physician for medical

6
7
8
9
10

purposes and constituted an abuse and misuse of prescription drugs.
Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence. The ingested drugs
were taken despite treatment which Mr. Hardy had

frcm his addiction to such drugs and in contravention of the warnings and
counseling which he had received to stop taking such drugs.
11. At the time of his death Mr. Haindy was insured by Beneficial

11
12
13
14

received for withdrawal

Life Insurance Company under the terms of two group policies.

One

providing benefits of $25/000.00 in the event of death regardless of cause
and the other providing a benefit of $25,000.00 only in case of accidental
death.

Plaintiff Terri Hardy is the named beneficiary of both policies.

15
The benefits under the first policy were paid and this action relates to
16
the accidental death policy which provides in pertinent part as follows:
17i(
Accidental Death: The Company will pay the sum for
which application was made by the Insured upon
receipt of due proof that the insured's death
resulted, directly and independently of all other
causes, from accidental bodily injury. . . .

18
19
20 M

12. Prior to Bryce Hardy's death, he had been diagnosed as

21

suffering from and had received treatment for drug dependency and abuse.

22

Attached

23

prescription records relating thereto.

24
25

hereto

as Exhibit

"G" are copies of medical

reports and

13. Mr. Hardy began using Darvon (a ttfade name for propoxyphene) by
November, 1973.

By November 1974, Mr. Hardy was abusing Darvon.

During

26
27
28
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I

the years 1974, 1975, and 1976, Mr. Hardy was repeatedly counseled and

9

warned by his physician that he was using excessive amounts of Darvon.

3

14. In March 1977, Mr. Hardy attexrpted to canrait suicide by taking

J

an overdose of Vadium (a centrally acting tranquilizing depressant) tablets

J

and alcohol and was transported by ambulance to a hospital in a comatose

6

state.

-II

failure of his first marriage.

jj

During this time period Mr. Hardy was very despondent about the

15. In 1979, while employed as a miner with Etoery Mining Caipany,

J

Mr. Hardy was involved in an accident which injured his back. He received
prescriptions for drugs for treatment of his back pain.

At other times,

Mr. Hardy also received prescriptions for drugs for treatment of internal
disorders associated with a diseased pancreas.
16.

By late 1979, Mr. Hardy was dependent an, and misusing arri

abusing narcotic drugs including codeine, Tylenol 3 (a combination of
aretanincphen and codeine), Darvon (propoxyphene), T y l o x (a trade name for
oxycodone, a semi synthetic narcotic analgesic), Peroodan (also a trade
name for oxycodone) and Valiunu
17.
obtain

During 1980, and 1981, Mr. Hardy manipulated several doctors to

prescriptions

for

narcotic

drugs.

As

a

result

of

these

manipulations he was able to obtain large quantities of prescription drugs
which he abused and misused.
18.

In March, 1981, Don C. Lankford, a Clinical Social Worker and

Certified Social Worker, met on three occasions with Mr. Hardy

at the

request of Dr. Jackson who was considering performing back surgery on Mr.
Hardy. At the first meeting, Mr. Lankford administered a test kncwn as the
Minnesota Multiphasic

Personality

Inventory

(MMPI).

In their second

281
9
II

oocsze

1

meeting Mr. lankford discussed the results of the MMPI test. At that time

2

Mr. Hardy stated that he had a history of drug abuse and that he was

3

continuing to abuse and itrisnsft drugs.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

He further stated that he had

previously attempted suicide and that if he got a chance, he would kill
himself and that he wanted to die. Mr. lankford told Mr. Hardy "that if he
did not stop abusing and misusing drugs, he would end up killing himself.''
Mr. lankford further advised Mr. Hardy to seek help at the St. Benedict's
Hospital or at his local mental health oenter for his serious drug
problems.

After his meetings with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford advised Dr.

Jackson against performing surgery on Mr. Hardy and that surgery was never
performed.

At the time Mr. Lankford met with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford was

of the opinion that Mr. Hardy understood the counsel which he had given him
and

the

consequences

of his

continued

misuse

and

abuse

of drugs.

Defendant's evidence would be as set foifth in the Affidavit of Don
Lankford, attached hereto as Exhibit "R".

Plaintiff has no evidence to

contradict such evidence.
19. On three occasions in the spfing of 1981, Mr. Hardy was
hospitalized for treatment of prescription drug dependency.
20. Mr. Hardy was hospitalized in Mountain View Hospital from March
23, 1981, to March 28, 1981, and showed a marked dependency on drugs such
as Darvon, lylox, Percodan and Amitriptyline

(an antidepressant).

He

requested high dosages of narcotic analgesics, but was taken off all
narcotic analgesics. When the narcotic analgesics were withdrawn Mr. Hardy
became hostile and irritable but later expressed gratitude for being helped

24
to rid himself of his dependency on such drugs.

25
21. After his discharge from Mountain View Hospital in late March

26
27
28
10

1

2

1981, Mr. Hard/ reverted to his old pattern of drug misuse and abuse.
22. On April

14, 1981, Mr. Hardy took an overdose of Darvon and

3

Methadone (a synthetic narcotic analgesic).

The overdose caused his body

4

to go into respiratory arrest. When his wife, Terri, observed Mr. Hardy in

5

respiratory arrest she tried to wake him up and when he didn't respond she

6

called an ambulance.

7

and admitted in a coiwtnse state.

He was taken by ambulance to Sanpete Valley Hospital

8

23. On the morning of April 15, 1981, medical personnel at Sanpete

9

Valley Hospital offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug rehabilitation

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

center but Mr. Hardy refused and indicated he preferred to stay in the
hospital.
24. On the morning of April 17, 1981, medical personnel at the
Sanpete Valley Hospital again offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug
rehabilitation center.
25. On April 17, 1981, Mr. Hardy left Sanpete Valley Hospital
without a discharge order but soon telephoned back for help. He expressed
willingness to go to a drug rehabilitation center and arrangements were
made through the Manti Mental Health Center to transfer him to the Drug
Rehabilitation
Hospital.

Program

in the Psychiatric

Department

of Utah Valley

Mr. Hardy voluntarily admitted himself to that program on April

17, 1981, for treatment of drug abuse.
26. While in Utah Valley Hospital from April 17, 1981, to April 27,
1981, Mr. Hardy admitted to various physicians and other medical personnel

23
that he was addicted to Valium and Peroodan, that he had used 12 Valium

24
tablets a day, that he had gone to many doctors to get drugs, that he had

25
used approximately 15-20 Peroodan tablets a day, and that when Peroodan was

26
27
28
u

00CS40

not available he used lyiox if TyLax was available.
27. While in the hospital front April 17, 1981, to April 27, 1981,
the amounts of narcotic analgesics supplied to Mr. Hardy were gradually
reduced until discontinued entirely.
28.

In the course of Mr. Hardy's treatment at the Utah Valley

Hospital in April 1981, Dr. Robert Crist advised Mr. Hardy that "his
continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a life-shortening process and
that he would be living on borrowed time."

Dr. Crist advised him that

"those vftio abuse and Tnireisp drugs, in the manner which he had done, live
very short lives and that few of those who continue to abuse and misuse
drugs to the degree that Bryoe W. Hardy had done lived beyond the age of
thirty."
Crist.

Mr. Hardy voiced his understanding of the advice given by Dr.
Defendant's evidence would be as set forth in the Affidavit of

Robert Crist, M.D., attached hereto as Exhibit "I".

Plaintiff has no

evidence to contradict such evidence.
29. Wiile

in Utah Valley Hospital

in April

1981, Mr. Hardy

expressed to a nurse, Diane Sandstrcni Nance, his understanding that he
needed to overcame his drug abuse problem, otherwise he would die as a
result of his misuse and abuse of drugs.

Diane Nance noted in the

Inpatient Psychiatric Nurses Notes as follows:
[Mr. Hardy] came to sane conclusions in group
therapy.
[He] decided to let his wife knew and
help her to understand his reasons for being here.
That even though she needs him at heme new, in the
long run he needs to be here. He said he'd rather
be here for awhile than be dead.
30. On his release from Utah Valley Hospital on April 27, 1981, Mr.
Hardy was referred to the Central Utah Mental Health Clinic for outpatient
treatment of drug abuse.
7
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31. After his discharge frtxn Utah Valley Hospital in late April
1981, Mr. Hardy again reverted to drug abuse and misuse.
32. Fran May 21, 1981, to May 31, 1981, Mr. Hardy was again
hospitalized in Utah Valley Hospital for treatment for drug abuse.
33. While in Utah Valley Hospital in late May 1981, Mr. Hardy was
again counseled and admonished about his drug problem.
34. Hardy was a person of normal intelligence and was not suffering

i

8
9
10
11

from any mental disease or defect during his life or at the time of his
death which prohibited him from understanding the warnings which he had
received relating to continued drug abuse and misuse or from understanding
that the probable and expected consequence of continued misuse and abuse of
drugs would be his untimely death. Mr. Hardy expressed an understanding of

12
the counsel and warnings given to him by these health care professionals

13
regarding the dangers of his continued drug abuse and misuse and there is

14
no evidence that at the time of his death he was not able to comprehend the

15
consequences of his acts.

Defendant's evidence would also be as set forth

16
in the Affidavit of Bryan S. Finkle, attached hereto as Exhibit "J".

17
Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence.

18
19

DATED this

— day of January, 1988.

20
HCUPT & ECKERSIZY

21
22
2311

M. David Eckersley

Attorney for Plaintiff

24
25
26
27 I

8

28
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rtLtu IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Sail Lake County Utah

FEB 10 7933
H. Dixcn Kincflcy. Clerk 3rc Dist. Court
By
£—OA-'I.'^.^
J Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SHE THIRD JUDICIAL DISIRICT
IN AND FOR SALT IAKE GOUNIY, STATE OF UTAH
TERRI C. HARDY, ET AL,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE INTRY

vs.
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.,

CASE NO. C-83-6569

Defendant.

Ihe Court having heard argument, having considered the memorandum and
the points and authorities filed by each party herein, and having read the
authorities cited to the Court rules herein as follows. The Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgement is denied. The Court having read the
authorities is of the opinion that the actions of the decedant in taking
drugs, which ultimately caused his death, was not intended by the victim at
the time that the drugs were taken to cause his death. Ihe Court is of the
opinion that Hoffman v. Life Insurance Ccnpany of North America, 669 P. 2d
410 (Utah, 1983) and the standards set forth in Richards v. Standard
Accident Insurance Ccnpany 58 Utah 662, 200 P. 1017 (1921) govern herein.
It was in Richards that our Supreme Court first established the standard for
defining the words "accident" or "accidental." It was there said, "the word
is descriptive of means which produce effects which are not their natural

15
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HARDY V. BENEFICIAL LIFE
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and probable consequences...." It was further said there, "It is either the
result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that every man must be
held to intend the natural and probable consequences of his deeds." Hoffman
then goes en to cite numerous cases in which the Richard's Standard had been
applied consistently by the Supreme Court of Utah.
The argument between the parties here relates to, in effect, a time
continuum.

It would be the argument of the defense that Mr. Hardy's taking

of drugs knewing that continued drug usage over a period of time would
shorten his life, perhaps to the point where he would die before the age of
30 (which he in fact did), or that he oould die at probably any time after
ingesting drugs would not meet the definition of accident in Hoffman and
Richards. Hcwever, the problem is that under the Hoffman definition, his
taking of the drugs either must be the intended result or one which was
"...the natural and probable consequences of his deeds." There is no
evidence of intention in this case. As a matter of fact, the presumption is
against an attempted suicide and, thus, the latter phrase must be looked to.
While the Court could believe under sane circumstances that a person
intended to die by taking excessive drugs given, the facts of this case
relating to Mr. Hardy's prior attenpts at rehabilitation, his work pattern
the day before his death, and the activities carried on the evening before
his death, it is difficult for this Court to find as a matter of law that
the victim (through whose eyes we must see in order to determine the intent)
intended to die by taking drugs as he did. This is particularly true given

HARD¥ V. BENEFICIAL LIFE

PAGE THREE

C-83-6569

the general attitude of most humans who undertake something risky. It is
for the thrill of the risk and surviving it that the act is undertaken. It
is seldan intended, e&though it might be anticipated, that injury or death
might arise.
The Plaintiff »s attorney will prepare the order denying Summary
^

Judgement.
Dated this

f

day of February, 1988.

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK
Deputy blerfc

17
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct, postage prepaid copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry was mailed to:
George Fanney, Esq.
700-38 Eagle Gate Tcwer
60 East South Terrple
Salt lake City, UT 84111
David J. Hbldsworth
700-38 Eagle Gate Tcwer
60 East Scxith Tenple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Virginius Dahney, Esq.
Kearns Building - Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, OT 84101
M. David Eckersley, Esq.
419 Boston Building
Salt lake City, UT 84111
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MAY 9 1S83
M. D a v i d E c k e r s l e y

(0956)

H. Dixon

HOUPT & ECKERSLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-0453

By

i-.'st Court

4C<

IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T F O R SALT L A K E C O U N T Y
STATE OF UTAH
T E R R I C. H A R D Y , et a l . ,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF L A W A N D J U D G M E N T

Plaintiff,
vs.
BENEFICIAL LIFE
CO. ,

INSURANCE

Civil N o : C-83-6569

Defendant.

T h i s m a t t e r w a s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Court u p o n
facts.

stipulated

T r i a l w a s h e l d o n J a n u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 8 8 , w i t h p l a i n t i f f being

r e p r e s e n t e d by D a v i d E c k e r s l e y a n d d e f e n d a n t b y G e o r g e J.
Romney.

T h e Court, h a v i n g r e v i e w e d the s t i p u l a t i o n and a t t a c h e d

exhibits, and having considered the arguments and memoranda
o f c o u n s e l h e r e b y e n t e r s the f o l l o w i n g o r d e r :
FINDINGS OF FACT
T h e Court finds the facts to b e t h o s e set forth in
the s t i p u l a t i o n e x e c u t e d by the p a r t i e s a n d filed w i t h the Court
on J a n u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 8 8 .

0 0 ^ 9 7r>

CONCLUSION OF LAW
As the stipulated facts do not demonstrate that
Mr. Bryce Hardy either intended or expected that his consumption
of drugs would cause his death on September 10, 1981, the Court
concludes that Mr. Hardy's death was the result of accidental
bodily injury within the meaning of the insurance policy in
question.
JUDGMENT
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff
Terri C. Hardy and against defendant Beneficial Life Insurance
Company in the amount of $25,000.00, together with prejudgment
interest at the rate of 107o per annum from November 10, 1981
until the date of this Judgment.
DATED this V

day of May, 1988.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed this ^ 4 l day of April, 1988, to the
following:
George J. Romney
ROMNEY & CONDIE
60 East South Temple
700-38 Eagle Gate Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

HOUPT & E C K E R S L E Y ^

